The North Carolina Superior Court held that intercompany transfers of product between affiliated entities do not constitute “sales” subject to sales tax when those transfers are not supported by bargained-for consideration, even if the taxpayer records the transfers using hypothetical “due to/due from” accounting entries.
The taxpayer, Asphalt Emulsion Industries, LLC (AEI), was a single-member North Carolina LLC wholly owned by Slurry Pavers, Inc. (SPI), a Virginia-based road construction company. AEI operated a facility in Dunn, North Carolina, where it manufactured asphalt emulsion.
During the audit period, AEI’s business model was primarily limited to supplying asphalt emulsion to SPI and other of AEI’s affiliates. At the direction of its parent, SPI, AEI transferred the vast majority of its finished product to SPI and another affiliate, Whitehurst Paving Company (WPC), for use in paving projects. These transfers occurred without invoices, purchase orders, or actual payments. Instead, the entities used a centralized accounting software a to track the movement of inventory.
Following an audit, the North Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) issued an assessment of over $2.5 million in taxes, penalties, and interest. The Department’s position was rooted in how AEI recorded these transfers. For internal bookkeeping, AEI used “due to/due from” entries in the centralized accounting system. These entries were based on a hypothetical markup – the price a third party might have paid – rather than the actual cost of production. Accordingly, the emulsion product “was ultimately reported for tax purposes as being transferred at cost rather than at the hypothetical markup amount.”
The Department contended that the taxes should have been remitted based on the hypothetical markup price, and that AEI erroneously treated itself as a mere division of SPI.
The core of the dispute turned on the definition of a “Sale” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-164.3(235), which requires a “transfer for consideration.”
AEI argued that no sales occurred because there was no consideration. The “due to/due from” entries were purely internal recordkeeping tools used for management purposes and did not represent an obligation to pay. AEI emphasized that SPI already paid sales and use tax on the cost of the raw materials used to make the emulsion.
The Department argued that the accounting entries were, in effect, “accounts receivable.” They argued that even if cash didn’t change hands, the entries represented a legal right to payment. Furthermore, the Department pointed to the “cash infusions” and centralized services (like payroll and accounting) provided by SPI to AEI as the “consideration” AEI received in exchange for the emulsion.
The Superior Court agreed with the taxpayer, affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s grant of summary judgment for AEI. The court explained that the plain meaning of consideration requires a bargained-for exchange. The Court rejected the notion that “due to/due from” entries are “accounts receivable.” Under North Carolina law, an account receivable requires an actual amount owed. Here, the evidence showed that no party ever intended for these hypothetical amounts to be paid.
The Court further found no link between the general support SPI provided to AEI (like paying its payroll) and the specific transfers of emulsion. To be “for consideration,” the sale, the benefit must be sought in exchange for the specific promise or performance. SPI’s general funding of its subsidiary was simply the behavior of a parent company, not a quid pro quo for individual batches of asphalt.
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Asphalt Emulsion Indus., LLC, 2026 NCBC 5 (Jan. 21, 2026).















































































































